Archive for January, 2008

Kentucky foreclosures skyrockets in Sept., to 7th. highest in nation

Thursday, January 31st, 2008

A national survey has ranked Kentucky 7th in mortgage foreclosures based on September data, according to the Kentucky Office of Financial Institutions. 

The Mortgage Bankers Association survey–which only includes data on foreclosures made due to loan nonpayment, not tax nonpayment–showed that 2.13 percent of the state’s 441,478 mortgage loans were in foreclosure, compared to 1.9 percent at the end of June, OFI’s Cordell Lawrence told the House Banking and Insurance committee today. 

That is a gloomier picture than the one reported last month by the firm RealtyTrac, which bases foreclosure data on the number of households in each state. Kentucky ranked 35th nationwide in foreclosure activity for the month of November based on RealtyTrac’s data, Lawrence said.   

Kentucky had 758 foreclosure filings in November –or one for every 2,461 households– according to RealtyTrac, compared to 1 foreclosure per 307 households in Ohio and 1 per 282 households in Florida. 


“What I take from this is in Kentucky, more people own their homes and don’t have a loan against it,” Lawrence said. 


Improvements to the overall market may come later this year when millions of adjustable rate mortgages and other loans are reset and other steps are taken to mitigate the situation, Lawrence said. Doing more nationally to ensure that homeowners can pay on their loans could also help, he added. 

State Senate approves drug treatment bill that could allow diversion of felony drug offenses

Thursday, January 31st, 2008

Jan. 31, 2008 A proposal to help arrested drug addicts be treated before heading to trial won unanimous approval in the Senate today.  Senate Bill 72, co-sponsored by Senate Majority Floor Leader Dan Kelly, R-Springfield, and Senate Minority Floor Leader Ed Worley, D-Richmond, passed on a 36-0 vote and now heads to the House for its consideration. 

“What we’re doing is not working,” Worley said. Kelly noted that if the state spending on correction now had kept pace with spending in 1970, it would cost $50 million to house prisoners today. Instead, he said, the commonwealth spends around $400 million.

  Sen. Tom Buford, R-Nicholasville, recognized the impact on the state budget. “We’re sacrificing educational dollars for prison dollars,” he said. 

Under the plan, those charged with a felony would be screened for substance abuse problems before they appear for trial. At the trial judge’s discretion, the offender could be ordered into a recovery program as a condition of bail.

If they completed the pretrial diversion program and did not commit any other offenses, the charges could eventually be dropped and no felony listed on their record.   

Benham Sims III interviewed re: BA machine source code ruling

Thursday, January 31st, 2008

 Can eating a slice of bread give false positive BA reading? 

Jan. 31, 2008 -  WHAS Channel 11 television interviewed Louisville attorney Benham Sims III on the recent Ct. of Appeals ruling that permitted defense attorneys to subpoena the source code of the Intoxilyzer 5000 BA machine. Sims is the author of a book on DUI law and has served as a District Judge and as a prosecutor handling DUI cases.

Defense attorneys say that they will have the computer software source code reviewed by experts to determine if the BA machine as used in Ky. is subject to false readings.

The interview claims one machine found a person had consumed alcohol merely by eating a piece of bread.  See this interesting interview at:  Breathalyzer controversy


Governor Beshear Appoints Chappell District Judge

Thursday, January 31st, 2008

Jan. 31, 2008 FRANKFORT, KY – Gov. Steve Beshear has appointed the Honorable John Paul Chappell to the office of District Judge for the 27th Judicial District, Division 2, of Kentucky, serving Knox and Laurel Counties. The vacancy was created when Judge Michael Caperton was elected to the Kentucky Court of Appeals. 

Chappell, 37, has been in private practice in London since 1999. He has tried civil and criminal cases in state and federal district courts. Chappell also has presented oral arguments before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Kentucky Supreme Court. He received his undergraduate degree from Eastern Kentucky University. Chappell then earned his juris doctorate from the University of Kentucky College of Law. He lives in London with his wife, Sherri, and their three children. 

This appointment shall serve until the November 4, 2008, general election.  When a judicial vacancy occurs, attorneys can recommend someone or nominate themselves. Nominees return a questionnaire to the Office of the Chief Justice. The Chief Justice then meets with the Judicial Nominating Commission in that area to choose three nominees to submit to the Governor. The Governor has 60 days to appoint a replacement. 


Thursday, January 31st, 2008

Election 2008 National Head-to-Head Polls

John McCain (R) vs. Hillary Clinton (D)
Poll Date Sample McCain (R) Clinton (D) Spread
RCP Average 01/09 to 01/27 - 46.8% 45.0% McCain +1.8%
Rasmussen 01/25 – 01/27 1200 LV 48% 40% McCain +8%
NBC/WSJ 01/20 – 01/22 1008 A 46% 44% McCain +2%
LA Times/Bloomberg 01/18 – 01/22 1312 RV 42% 46% Clinton +4%
USA Today/Gallup 01/10 – 01/13 1106 LV 50% 47% McCain +3%
Hotline/FD 01/10 – 01/12 803 RV 47% 43% McCain +4%
CNN 01/09 – 01/10 840 RV 48% 50% Clinton +2%
See More General Election: McCain vs. Clinton Polls | Chart

John McCain (R) vs. Barack Obama (D)
Poll Date Sample McCain (R) Obama (D) Spread
RCP Average 01/09 to 01/27 - 44.7% 43.2% McCain +1.5%
Rasmussen 01/25 – 01/27 1200 LV 47% 41% McCain +6%
NBC/WSJ 01/20 – 01/22 1008 A 42% 42% Tie
LA Times/Bloomberg 01/18 – 01/22 1312 RV 42% 41% McCain +1%
USA Today/Gallup 01/10 – 01/13 1106 LV 50% 45% McCain +5%
Hotline/FD 01/10 – 01/12 803 RV 39% 41% Obama +2%
CNN 01/09 – 01/10 840 RV 48% 49% Obama +1%
See More General Election: McCain vs. Obama Polls | Chart

Mitt Romney (R) vs. Hillary Clinton (D)
Poll Date Sample Romney (R) Clinton (D) Spread
RCP Average 01/09 to 01/22 - 38.8% 51.2% Clinton +12.4%
Rasmussen 01/21 – 01/22 800 LV 42% 47% Clinton +5%
NBC/WSJ 01/20 – 01/22 1008 A 36% 52% Clinton +16%
LA Times/Bloomberg 01/18 – 01/22 1312 RV 39% 50% Clinton +11%
Hotline/FD 01/10 – 01/12 803 RV 37% 49% Clinton +12%
CNN 01/09 – 01/10 840 RV 40% 58% Clinton +18%
See More General Election: Romney vs. Clinton Polls | Chart

Mitt Romney (R) vs. Barack Obama (D)
Poll Date Sample Romney (R) Obama (D) Spread
RCP Average 01/09 to 01/22 - 34.2% 51.2% Obama +17.0%
Rasmussen 01/21 – 01/22 800 LV 38% 47% Obama +9%
NBC/WSJ 01/20 – 01/22 1008 A 35% 48% Obama +13%
LA Times/Bloomberg 01/18 – 01/22 1312 RV 35% 46% Obama +11%
Hotline/FD 01/10 – 01/12 803 RV 26% 56% Obama +30%
CNN 01/09 – 01/10 840 RV 37% 59% Obama +22%

The Supreme Court and the Anti-Retroactivity Presumption

Thursday, January 31st, 2008

by Patricia Mann   Jan. 31, 2008
Ex post facto laws retroactively change the legal consequences of acts, or the legal status of facts and relationships that existed prior to the enactment of the law. Justice Joseph Story, a member of the Supreme Court in the early 19th Century, defined a retroactive statute as “taking away or impairing vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creating a new obligation, or imposing a new duty, or attaching a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past.” Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F.Cas.756,767(No.13 156)(CCNH 1814). Ex post facto laws offend against basic principles of fairness and due process in a free and democratic society. Congress is prohibited from passing ex post facto laws by Article I, Section 9, of the United States Constitution, and the states are prohibited from passing such laws by Section 10 of Article I. The idea is that individuals must be given fair notice of acts that will be prohibited by the state, so that they can choose to behave in ways that conform with the laws.
Nevertheless, in a much criticized decision, Calder v. Bull , 3 Dall. 386, 390-391, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.). the Supreme Court qualified the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, ruling that it only applies in criminal law, not in civil law. Because immigration law is part of the civil law, even when it determines the immigration consequences of criminal behavior, the legacy of Calder v. Bull has been of great significance for immigration law.
In 1996, Congress passed two pieces of legislation, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”). These new laws changed the rules, the rights and obligations, for documented, as well as undocumented noncitizens in the United States in draconian ways. One of the major issues raised by this new legislation was whether the various provisions of these laws would apply retroactively (or retrospectively – the terms are interchangeable) to noncitizens. In the case of a few provisions, notably, the expanded definition of an ‘aggravated felony,’ Congress had explicitly written the law to state that the new definitions would apply retroactively.1 Ever since Calder v. Bull, in 1798, Congress has had the authority to designate that new civil laws will apply retrospectively, but it is required to make its intention for a retroactive application very explicit in the law itself. Otherwise, as indicated by the quotation from Justice Story above, there is a 200 year tradition of constitutional law in the United States, following upon a much longer common law tradition, supporting an anti-retroactivity presumption with regard to any new piece of civil legislation. Since the intentions of Congress were not clearly and unmistakably written into most provisions of AEDPA and IIRIRA, there has been a great deal of litigation over the past decade attempting to clarify whether particular provisions would be applied retroactively or instead merely prospectively.
Landgraf v. USI Film Products
In a landmark decision, Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994), the Supreme Court reviewed the Court’s long history of decisions regarding retroactive legislation, and reasserted the presumption against retroactive legislation:
Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted. For that reason, the “principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal appeal.” Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855, 110 S.Ct. 1570, 1586, 108 L.Ed.2d 842 (1990) (SCALIA, J., concurring).
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. at 265.
The Court also noted specific concerns raised by retroactive statutes:
The Legislature’s unmatched powers allow it to sweep away settled expectations suddenly and without individualized consideration. Its responsivity to political pressures poses a risk that it may be tempted to use retroactive legislation as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals.
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. at 266.
Of course, particular immigrant groups, as well as immigrants more generally, have frequently been the object of harsh, reactive, retroactive legislation, promoted by politicians blaming foreign workers rather than more basic aspects of the American social and economic structure for economic instability and social woes. In this regard, we immediately think of the 2005 REAL ID Act, as well as IIRIRA and AEDPA, but the Landgraf Court offered some historical perspective, pointing to a case from 125 years ago, Chew Heong v. United States, involving a bi-lateral treaty between China and the United States, and legislation enacting the treaty:
At issue in Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 5 S.Ct. 255, 28 L. Ed. 770 (1884), for example, was a provision of the “Chinese Restriction Act” of 1882 barring Chinese laborers from reentering the United States without a certificate prepared when they exited this country. We held that the statute did not bar the reentry of a laborer who had left the United States before the certification requirement was promulgated. Justice Harlan’s opinion for the Court observed that the law in effect before the 1882 enactment had accorded laborers a right to reenter without a certificate, and invoked the “uniformly” accepted rule against “giv[ing] to statutes a retrospective operation, whereby rights previously vested are injuriously affected, unless compelled to do so by language so clear and positive as to leave no room to doubt that such was the intention of the legislature.” Id. at 559, 5 S.Ct., at 266-267; Landgraf, at 271-2.
The legal formalities were much less developed in 1880, but essentially, Congress was attempting to change the conditions of reentry for a Chinese laborer after he had left the country. Pursuant to a treaty between the United States and China, signed on November 17, 1880, insofar as Chew Heong was a Chinese laborer residing in the United States on that day, he acquired unrestricted rights of reentry upon leaving the country. Chew Heong duly left for Honolulu, in the Kingdom of Hawaii on June 18, 1881, and returned to San Francisco on September 22, 1884, but was barred from reentry and detained on the ship. While he was gone, Congress had ratified the treaty in 1882, and approved an amended version of the treaty on July 5, 1884, requiring a certificate from all Chinese laborers who had left the United States by sea prior to May 6, 1882, and returned after July 5, 1884. Essentially the law required Chew Heong to have procured before he left the United States, a certificate (what we would today refer to as an advance parole document) for which the law, at that time, made no provision. Chew Heong, 112 U.S. at 539. Echoing Justice Story, Justice Harlan readily dismissed this retroactive requirement for a certificate, stating that courts “uniformly refuse to give to statutes a retrospective operation whereby rights previously vested are injuriously affected, unless compelled to do so by language so clear and positive as to leave no room to doubt that such was the intention of the legislature.” Id. at 559.
It is somewhat discomfiting, of course, that legal statements repudiating retroactive statutes as unfair, are qualified by the court’s acknowledgement that insofar as Congress provides strong and clear language expressing its intention for retrospective application of a particular law, the Court must honor those intentions. Happily, clear and unequivocal statements of Congressional intentions are not common.
The Two Step Retroactivity Analysis of Landgraf
Not all retroactive applications of new laws are disadvantageous to the individuals affected by the new law.2 The petitioner, Barbara Landgraf, had been found the victim of sexual harassment and a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. But she was found not entitled to equitable relief by the District Court, and that was the only form of relief allowed by Title VII at that time. However, she appealed her case, and while the appeal was pending, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was signed into law, and this new legislation allowed jury trials and both compensatory and punitive damages, for which Landgraf would have been eligible. The question in Landgraf v. USI was whether the appeals court should have applied the law in effect at the time of the discriminatory conduct, as they did, or instead should have applied the law in effect at the time of its decision in July 1992, allowing Petitioner to recover damages for her injuries.
The Landgraf Court finally decided that even this statute should not be applied retroactively. But because this statute is a remedial statute rather than a statute imposing a new penalty, the questions of where justice lies are very difficult ones.3 Perhaps because of this context, the Landgraf Court analysis of the various grounds for rejecting retroactive statutes is nuanced and finally uncompromising.
The Landgraf decision is frequently cited as the source for a two-step analysis of whether a statute will have a retroactive application. Step One focuses on Congressional Intent:
When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in suit, the court’s first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default rules. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S at 280.
When Congressional intent is clearly written into the statute, the inquiry ends at that point. Of course, there is frequently room for legal disagreement over the quality of Congressional intent. In any case, if the Court determines that Congressional intent is not sufficiently clear, Step Two involves evaluating the substantive effects of the statutory provision:
When, however, the statute contains no such express command, the court must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the statute would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result. Id.
In the case at hand, the Landgraf Court determined that Congressional intent was not clear, and that insofar as the new compensatory damages provision in the 1991 Civil Rights Act imposed a new liability on the employer, “fairness concerns would not be absent” if the damages provision of the new act were to apply to events preceding its enactment. So it was the kind of provision that would not apply to events antedating its enactment in the absence of clear congressional intent. Landgraf at 283.
Recognizing that retroactive application of a remedial statute like the one in the 1991 Civil Rights Act might well appeal to our sense of justice, the Landgraf Court was very definite in rejecting such additional arguments as essentially irrelevant:
It will frequently be true, as petitioner and amici forcefully argue here, that retroactive application of a new statute would vindicate its purpose more fully. That consideration, however, is not sufficient to rebut the presumption against retroactivity. Landgraf, 285-6
For the Landgraf Court, the presumption against retroactivity is qualified only by Congressional intent to the contrary.
I.N.S. v. St. Cyr
Just two years after the Landgraf decision, Congress passed AEDPA and then IIRIRA, and given a lack of Congressional clarity in many provisions of these statutes, major debates ensued over whether their application should be prospective only, or instead retroactive. Finally, in 2001, in I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), the Supreme Court addressed the retroactivity issue in AEDPA and IIRIRA. St. Cyr had pled guilty to a crime for which he was deportable in March 1996. But in March 1996, he was also eligible for a § 212(c) waiver of deportation. The question for the Court was whether St.Cyr remained eligible for the 212(c) relief after IIRIRA went into effect in April 1997, given the fact that IIRIRA eliminated 212(c) waivers.
Regarding Step One of the Landgraf analysis, the St. Cyr Court found no clearly expressed congressional intent as to whether the elimination of § 212(c) relief is to be applied retroactively. The Court emphasized the demanding standard for finding such intent: “Cases where this Court has found truly ‘retroactive’ effect adequately authorized by statute have involved statutory language that was so clear that it could sustain only one interpretation.” St. Cyr at 316-17 (2001); quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 328 n.4 (1997). The Court finds no such clarity in the language of AEDPA or IIRIRA.
With regard to Step Two of the Landgraf analysis, the St. Cyr Court emphasized that their aim was,
to determine whether depriving removable aliens of consideration for § 212(c) relief produces an impermissible retroactive effect for aliens who, like Respondent, were convicted pursuant to a plea agreement at a time when their plea would not have rendered them ineligible for § 212(c) relief.” St. Cyr at 230.
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, as he did in Landgraf, readily finds that people like St. Cyr, who entered plea agreements rather than going to trial, may be presumed to have done so with expectations that 212(c) relief would be available to them if necessary. So, IIRIRA’s elimination of 212(c) waivers, if applied retroactively to people like St. Cyr, would clearly attach “a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past.” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 321.
By contrast with the Landgraf Court’s entirely formal presumption that the possibility for compensatory damages under the 1991 Civil Rights Act imposed new liabilities on the employer and so created an unacceptable retroactive effect, the St.Cyr Court is more diligent in explaining the quality of the new disability imposed by giving IIRIRA retroactive effects. The Court here emphasized the quid pro quo of criminal defendants who give up their right to trial and plead guilty in exchange for settled expectations of their punishment, and in this case, of their eligibility for 212(c) waivers of deportation for the crimes they pled guilty to. Landgraf at 322. The Court emphasized the objective fact of reliance upon the availability of a 212(c) waiver for all those who entered plea agreements for crimes that made them deportable or removable. Id. at 323-4. Focusing much more on the quality of the disability than did the Landgraf Court, the St. Cyr Court concluded:
Because respondent, and other aliens like him, almost certainly relied upon that likelihood [of receiving 212(c) relief] in deciding whether to forego their right to a trial, the elimination of any possibility of § 212(c) relief by IIRIRA has an obvious and severe retroactive effect.” 325.
Under considerable pressure to find a defensible retroactive effect, even though they had found no clear Congressional intent in this regard, the Court held firm and explained in detail the quality of disability imposed on individuals who have made plea agreements with the expectation of 212(c) availability. However, by introducing the language of an “impermissible retroactive effect,” the Court has now suggested there may be permissible retroactive effects. The unconditional rejection of retroactive applications of statutes when not clearly prescribed by a legislature found in Landgraf has been eroded somewhat in St. Cyr.
Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 2006
The most recent Supreme Court decision on retroactivity, Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzalez, 126 S.Ct.2422 (2006), dealt with a particularly harsh provision of IIRIRA, Reinstatement of Removal.4 Petitioner, Fernandez-Vargas, had come to the United States in the 1970s, and been deported several times. After his last illegal reentry in 1982, he married, had a child and starting a trucking business, and lived a productive life for the next twenty years in Utah. Only when he applied to adjust status in 2003, based on a relative visa petition filed by his wife, did immigration authorities begin proceedings. They reinstated his 1981 deportation order, based upon a reinstatement provision created by IIRIRA, leaving Fernandez-Vargas ineligible for any relief. The question was whether the IIRIRA Reinstatement provision should apply to those who reentered prior to the April 1,1997 date when IIRIRA’s reinstatement provision first became effective. As usual, Congressional intentions were not made clear in the written law.
Justice Stevens, who had written the majority decisions in Landgraf and St. Cyr, found that this IIRIRA reinstatement provision had very obvious, very serious adverse consequences for Fernandez-Vargas, and thus clear retroactive effects. He concluded that it should not apply to preenactment reentries, like that of Fernandez-Vargas. Fernandez-Vargas at 2436, 2434 (2006). However, Justice Stevens was dissenting in this case. Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion, holding that the IIRIRA Reinstatement provision did apply, even to preenactment reentries that took place fifteen years before IIRIRA came into existence, like that of Fernandez-Vargas in 1982. The majority reasoned that this provision had no retroactive effect, insofar as “it is the conduct of remaining in the country after entry that is the predicate action; the statute applies to stop an indefinitely continuing violation that the alien himself could end at any time…” Fernandez-Vargas at 2431.
Towards a Jurisprudence of Permissible Retroactive Effects?
Obviously, Fernandez-Vargas did not have the same ‘contractual moment of reliance’ upon the past regime as did St. Cyr and others who made plea agreements prior to April 1997. On the other hand, what Justice Souter refers to as “the new and less generous legal regime” of IIRIRA clearly results in a “new disability” and adverse consequences for Petitioner, as Justice Stevens emphasized in his dissent. The Landgraf Court’s unconditional rejection of retroactive statutory applications not clearly prescribed by Congress, qualified somewhat in St.Cyr, is further eroded in this decision. The majority in Fernandez-Vargas has, in effect, begun to develop a jurisprudence of ‘permissible retroactive effects.’
In a future article, recent decisions of various Circuit Courts of Appeals will be discussed, and jurisprudential possibilities in a time of political strife and confusion will be considered.

1 A criminal conviction that is characterized as an aggravated felony renders the noncitizen deportable and also disqualifies him or her from most forms of relief against deportation. § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides a ground of deportability based on an aggravated felony conviction. The various offenses that are defined as aggravated felonies are listed under §101(a)(43).
2SeeEg. Cyrus D. Mehta, “BIA Rules that Child Status Protection Act Retroactively Applies to Children of US Citizens,” February 9, 2007,, discussing the fact that the retroactive application of the CSPA benefits children who aged out before August 6, 2002.
3 Justice Stephens explained that this case involved an apparent conflict between various different rules or canons. First, was a conflict between the rule that “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision,” and the contrary axiom that “retroactivity is not favored in the law… and congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result.” In addition, there was conflict between two further canons of statutory construction: 1) remedial statutes are to be liberally construed and if a retroactive interpretation will promote the ends of justice, they should receive such a construction; 2) A statute imposing a new penalty or forfeiture or a new liability or disability, or creating a new right of action will not be construed as having a retroactive effect; citing Llewellyn, “Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes are to be Construed,” 3 Vand.L.Rev.395 (1950). Landgraf, at 264, FN 16.
4 See Cyrus D. Mehta, “Reinstatement of Removal,” May 13, 2005,
This article was originally published on on December 29, 2007.

Chief Justice supports Beshear plan to review Penal Code to reduce prison overcrowding

Thursday, January 31st, 2008

Professor Lawson’s call for review of Penal Code finally on track.

Jan. 31, 2008
Kentucky’s prison population has skyrocketed 600 percent since 1970 and continues to grow because of “irrational” penalties enacted by lawmakers, according to a study byUK Law School Professor Robert Lawson, the man who wrote the state’s penal code.
The budget for housing state prisoners has risen from $7 million to more than $300 million over that same period and is threatening to bankrupt the system, Lawson says in a report that he’s shared with leaders in all three branches of government.  See this report at: DIFFICULT TIMES IN KENTUCKY CORRECTIONS—AFTERSHOCKS OF A “TOUGH ON CRIMEâ€? PHILOSOPHY by Robert G. Lawson
Excerpts from AP article Jan. 31, 2008-
 Kentucky  Supreme Court Chief Justice Joseph Lambert  said yesterday he agrees with Gov. Steve Beshear’s plan to look at ways to decrease the load on the state’s prison system.
Chief Justice Joseph Lambert said he was pleased by Beshear’s plans to assemble a criminal justice panel to review Kentucky’s penal code and find ways of relieving the financial strain caused by prison overcrowding.
Lambert said some offenders could avoid costly prison stays but still be dealt with appropriately.
“A whole host of things could be done that would keep them from being incarcerated but would still keep society’s thumb on them,” Lambert said.
Kentucky’s prison population has surpassed 22,440 prisoners and is projected to keep increasing, Beshear said. The prison budget now exceed $300 million dollars a year to maintain. In 1970, the population was fewer than 3,000 inmates.   The average cost to maintain one prison inmate is close to $15,000 a year.
To help stabilize the population and rein in costs, Beshear said he would create a panel to review the state’s penal code and find alternate ways to deal with nonviolent offenders. Beshear spokeswoman Vicki Glass said work on the task force was continuing and the governor was gathering information.
Lambert said many people with drug problems find themselves in a cycle that rotates them in and out of prison.
“We’re incarcerating a far greater percentage of people for longer and longer periods of time now than we’ve ever done before,” Lambert said.
Nearly 3,400 inmates currently in prison were convicted solely on drug offenses, said Lisa Lamb, a Department of Corrections spokeswoman. More than 2,400 of those were first-time offenders, Lamb said.
Though the increasing prison population is causing lawmakers and others to take notice, University of Kentucky law professor Robert Lawson said changes likely won’t come easily.
Lawson wrote much of Kentucky’s current penal code.
He said the current code looks “absolutely nothing like” what was passed in the 1970s, and people are serving longer and harsher sentences.
“They’ve jacked up any penalty that you can jack up,” Lawson said. “It’s not just the laws, it’s the attitudes. There isn’t any doubt that we’ve gone mad over incarceration.”

Chief Justice Lambert, lawmakers announce legislation to open court proceedings in child-protection cases

Wednesday, January 30th, 2008

Jan. 30, 2008 

FRANKFORT, Ky. – Chief Justice Joseph E. Lambert, Rep. Susan Westrom and Rep. Tom Burch announced legislation at a news conference today that would open certain Kentucky child-protection proceedings to the public. Child-protection court cases typically involve dependency, neglect and abuse, and termination of parental rights.

Currently, all juvenile court proceedings in Kentucky are closed and the records sealed. The legislation would not include opening juvenile criminal proceedings.

The legislation, which is expected to be filed this week, would authorize the creation of three to seven pilot projects to examine the feasibility and effectiveness of opening child-protection proceedings to the public. The pilot projects would operate for four years and would help determine if the practice should be expanded statewide. The pilot sites have not been identified.

“This legislation is a groundbreaking first step in allowing greater public access to juvenile court proceedings,� Chief Justice Lambert said. “It is vitally important that we maintain public trust and confidence in our child welfare system. This pilot program will give us time to learn whether opening child-protection proceedings to the public will bring about substantive improvements in our ability to protect Kentucky’s children.�

Rep. Westrom, D-Lexington, will be the bill’s primary sponsor, and Rep. Burch, D-Louisville, will be the main co-sponsor.

“It’s been a pleasure working on this initiative with the Chief Justice, who has the same desire I do in making sure families feel safe and heard in our courtrooms,� Rep. Westrom said.

Increased transparency in child-protection proceedings may enhance accountability among judges, attorneys, social workers and other professionals who have roles in those cases, Chief Justice Lambert said. Opening the courts would also serve as a way to alert interested parties to the proceedings who would otherwise be unaware of them, such as extended family members who might want to show support.     

Rep. Burch, who is chairman of the House Health and Welfare Committee, said it is important for the public to have the ability to witness court proceedings in child-protection cases.

“It’s about time the courts are opened up to let people see what goes on in decisions involving families,� Rep. Burch said. “By opening up the courts, I feel the public would be better informed and would see the good and the bad in some of the court decisions. I really appreciate the help and involvement of Chief Justice Lambert in bringing this legislation forward. He is showing great leadership.�

If the legislation passes, Chief Justice Lambert will be responsible for creating the corresponding Rules of Administrative Procedures under which the program would operate.

During the four-year pilot period, the Administrative Office of the Courts would monitor the program’s guidelines and limitations, suggest potential improvements and recommend rule changes if the initiative were to be implemented statewide.

Under the legislation, the AOC would provide an annual report to the Legislative Research Commission, which would include statistics, findings and recommendations. The AOC would also prepare periodic progress and statistical reports and provide suggestions to the Interim Joint Committee on Health and Welfare and the Interim Joint Committee on Judiciary at the discretion of Chief Justice Lambert. 

Further study of opening court proceedings in child-protection cases was a recommendation of the Transparency Workgroup of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services Blue Ribbon Panel on Adoption. Reps. Westrom and Burch are members of the panel, which is chaired by CHFS Deputy Secretary Steve Nunn.

“We view this legislation as an opportunity to explore the issue of transparency on a pilot basis,� Deputy Secretary Nunn said. “We look forward to working with the courts to determine whether and when transparency is appropriate, while balancing the best interests of children in our care.� 

Rep. Kathy Stein, D-Lexington, praised the Blue Ribbon Panel on Adoption for its efforts. “The task force doing this work is to be congratulated for its production of this good beginning of a solution for a complex problem,� said Rep. Stein, who chairs the House Judiciary Committee. 

Kentucky is one of approximately 20 states that have completely closed proceedings in child-protection cases, according to the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges. Other states have varying degrees of openness in their courts. 

As the administrative and fiscal agent for the Kentucky Court of Justice, the AOC supports the activities of approximately 4,000 court system employees, including the elected offices of justices, judges and circuit court clerks. 


Governor Beshears Ethics Reform Bill Passes House

Wednesday, January 30th, 2008

Jan. 30, 2008

FRANKFORT, KY – Gov. Steve Beshear’s ethics reform package passed through the House today by a unanimous vote of 94-0 and has been sent to the Senate for consideration.

“This proposal was the result of my campaign pledge to strengthen ethics laws that govern the conduct of state officials and employees,� said Beshear. “I am pleased with the House vote and await a positive outcome in the Senate.�

HB 250, sponsored by Rep. Mike Cherry, unanimously cleared the House State Government Committee last week


                     ETHICS BILL – HB 250



HB 250/CI (BR 503) – M. Cherry, J. Vincent, M. Denham, T. Riner
     AN ACT relating to executive branch ethics.
     Amend KRS 11A.010 to revise the definition of “officer” to include only salaried boards and commissions as subject to the entire ethics code; delete list of certain named boards and commissions; include in the definition of “public servant” any person who performs state service on contract in a full-time position and any person or position designated by executive order of the Governor; define “person,” “matter,” and “board member”; amend KRS 11A.020 to prohibit use of a public servant’s office or position when seeking other employment or contracting for services for oneself; prohibit the misuse of state time, equipment, personnel, facilities, or state resources for private business or campaigns; prohibit soliciting, selling to, or otherwise engaging in a financial transaction with a subordinate or a person or business whom the public servant regulates, does business with, or supervises in the public servant’s official capacity, if the economic benefit is greater than $50 in a single calendar year; amend KRS 11A.040 to allow acceptance of awards for exceptional service as long as it complies with the provisions relating to gifts in KRS 11A.045; prohibit a public servant from negotiating for future employment with a person or business with which the public servant is directly involved as part of his official duty; amend KRS 11A.045 to increase gifts limitation per source to $50 for a single calendar year; establish procedures for a public servant who wishes to accept donations from a legal defense fund; amend KRS 11A.050 to increase the filing deadline for financial disclosure statements from thirty days to ninety days after leaving state government; require disclosure if the nature of a listed business; amend KRS 11A.060, relating to the Executive Branch Ethics Commission, to require the Governor to appoint some members from nominees submitted by the Attorney General and the Auditor of Public Accounts; attach the Commission to the Finance and Administration Cabinet, rather than the Office of the Governor, for administrative purposes only; amend KRS 11A.080 to clarify that commission investigations are confidential unless there is a final order of the commission; permit the commission to release evidence to the Personnel Board for its use in conducting investigations; allow the commission to publicly confirm an investigation if the violations alleged were made public by another state agency and publicly referred to the Commission by that state agency; direct that a finding by the commission of a violation of the ethics code is a reason for dismissal or other discipline under KRS Chapter 18A; also apply to any public servant not subject to KRS 18A; amend KRS 11A.130 to clarify that the provision for employment in a privatized entity refers to a privatized service rather than to an entire privatized agency; create a new section of KRS Chapter 11A; prohibit a board member from contracting with the board or commission on which he or she serves; require board members to disclose any potential conflict of interest they may have and abstain from related decisions; subject board members to the limitations on acceptance of gifts; amend KRS 11A.990 to establish that salary withheld due to failure to file a financial statement by the deadline shall be withheld from the sixteenth day of noncompliance rather than the first day; amend KRS 61.102 to include the Executive Branch Ethics Commission as one of the state agencies to which whistleblowers may report possible violations of law without the fear of reprisal; amend KRS 61.103 to provide whistleblowers one year, instead of 90 days to bring an action for relief or damages.

     HFA (1, J. Hoover) – Retain language prohibiting a public servant from negotiating for employment with a person or business that does business with or is regulated by the agency for which he works; delete language pertaining to the public servant’s direct involvement in matters regarding the prospective employer.

     HFA (2, J. Hoover) – Make technical correction.

     HFA (3, J. Hoover) – Change the provision requiring commission investigations to be confidential “unless” there is a final order of the commission to “until” there is a final order of the commission.

     HFA (4, J. Hoover) – Prohibit the “misuse,” rather than “abuse,” of state time, equipment, personnel, facilities, or other state resources for private business purposes; prohibit the “use,” rather than “abuse,” of state time, equipment, personnel, facilities, or other state resources for political campaign purposes.

     HFA (5, J. Stacy) – Amend KRS 11A.040 to increase from six months to one year the period of time an officer or statewide elected official must wait before: (1) he may contract with the state agency by which he was previously employed, or (2) he may accept employment with a person or business that does business with or is regulated by the state agency by which he was employed; amend KRS 11A.130 by removing the provision allowing an officer or employee of a state agency or service that is privatized to accept employment with the new person or business if the officer or employee was not involved in the decision to privatize or in developing the privatization contract; add new language to prohibit, for one year, an officer or statewide elected official who is employed by a state agency that privatized a service, from accepting employment or compensation from the person or business responsible for the privatized service.
     Jan 10-introduced in House
     Jan 15-to State Government (H); posted in committee
     Jan 17-reported favorably, 1st reading, to Calendar
     Jan 18-2nd reading, to Rules
     Jan 23-posted for passage in the Regular Orders of the Day for Thursday, January 24, 2008
     Jan 24-floor amendments (1) (2) and (3) filed
     Jan 29-floor amendments (4) and (5) filed



Thirteen State Senate races contested

Wednesday, January 30th, 2008
  • 1st District Sen. Ken Winters, R-Murray, will face the winner of a Democratic Primary between Carroll Hubbard (former congressman) and Rick Johnson (former Appeals Court Judge). 
  • 3rd District: Sen. Joey Pendleton, D-Hopkinsville, versus Republican challenger Tom Jones, a Christian County magistrate. 
  • 5th District: Sen. Carroll Gibson, R-Leitchfield, versus Democratic challenger Barry Cannon of Caneyville — a rematch of the 2004 race that Gibson won. 
  • 7th District: Sen. Julian Carroll, D-Frankfort, UNOPPOSED 
  • 9th District OPEN SEAT Democratic Primary: Steve Newberry (broadcaster, businessman), John Rogers (Glasgow lawyer) and Horace F. Johnson (former law enforcement official). Republican Primary: Jeffery Jobe (newspaper publisher), David P. Givens of Greensburg and Bob Bryant of Glasgow. 
  • 11th District OPEN SEAT Republican Primary: Charlie Walton (former principal and former state Rep.) versus John Schickel (former U.S. Marshal) 
  • 13th District: Sen. Ernesto Scorsone, D-Lexington, UNOPPOSED 
  • 15th District: Sen. Vernie McGaha, R-Russell Springs, UNOPPOSED 
  • 17th District: Sen. Damon Thayer, R-Georgetown, will face the winner of the Democratic Primary between Rand L. Marshall (assistant Scott County attorney) and Robert Powell of Georgetown.  
  • 19th District: Sen. Tim Shaughnessy, D-Louisville, versus Republican Bob Heleringer, a lawyer and former state representative 
  • 21st District: Sen. Tom Jensen, R-London, UNOPPOSED 
  • 23rd District: Sen. Jack Westwood, R-Crescent Springs, versus Democrat Kathy Groob of Covington, a rematch of the 2004 race that Westwood won. 
  • 25th District: Sen. Robert Stivers, R-Manchester, will take on the winner of the Democratic Primary between Michael “Whitey” Adkins of West Liberty and Pete M. Frye of Campton.   
  • 27th District: Sen. Walter “Doc” Blevins, D-Sandy Hook, versus Republican Richard White of Morehead. 
  • 29th District Sen. Johnny Ray Turner, D-Drift, faces a Democratic primary challenge from Eric Shane Hamilton – a rematch of the 2004 primary election that Turner won by 24 votes. 
  • 31st District: Sen. Ray Jones, D-Pikeville, UNOPPOSED 
  • 33rd District Sen. Gerald Neal, D-Louisville, faces a Democratic primary challenge from  Marshall “Marty” Gazaway of  Louisville. 
  • 35th District: Sen. Denise Harper Angel, D-Louisville, versus Republican John Albers of Louisville 
  • 37th District: Sen. Perry Clark, D-Louisville, versus Republican Doug Hawkins (a Louisville metro councilman 


See listing of all candidates on the ballot this year

Wednesday, January 30th, 2008

          Ky. 2008 Candidate Filings  See who is running in the 2008 elections.

Wednesday, January 30th, 2008


Obama snubs Hillary at State of the Union address

Wednesday, January 30th, 2008

Jan. 30, 2008

Maureen Dowd of the New York Times wrote about THE SNUB:  “It’s already famous as The Snub, the moment before the State of the Union when Obama turned away to talk to Claire McCaskill instead of trying to join Teddy Kennedy in shaking hands with Hillary. 

Nobody cared about W., whose presidency had crumpled into a belated concern about earmarks. 

The only union that fascinated was Obama and Hillary, once more creeping around each other. 

It would have been the natural thing for the Illinois senator, only hours after his emotional embrace by the Kennedys and an arena full of deliriously shrieking students, to follow the lead of Uncle Teddy and greet the rebuffed Hillary. 

She was impossible to miss in the sea of dark suits and Supreme Court dark robes. Like Scarlett O’Hara after a public humiliation, Hillary showed up at the gathering wearing a defiant shade of red. 

But the fact that he didn’t do so shows that Obama cannot hide how much the Clintons rattle him, and that he is still taking the race very personally.� … 

“Obama said he was “surprised� by reports of The Snub. 

“I was turning away because Claire asked me a question as Senator Kennedy was reaching forward,� he said. “Senator Clinton and I have had very cordial relations off the floor and on the floor. I waved at her as I was coming into the Senate chamber before we walked over last night. I think there is just a lot more tea leaf reading going on here than I think people are suggesting.� 

But that answer is disingenuous. Their relations have been frosty and fraught ever since the young Chicago prince challenged Queen Hillary’s royal proclamation that it was her turn to rule.� 


Justice Dept. releases letter detailing investigation of Grant County Detention Center

Wednesday, January 30th, 2008


In May of 2005, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Dept. of Justice wrote a letter to the Grant County Judge Executive concerning its investigation of the operation of the Grant County Jail.

A full copy of that letter has been released by the U.S. Justice Cabinent and may be read at:

Excerpts from the letter:


“We conclude that certain conditions at the facility appear to violate the constitutional rights of the inmates confined there.�


“Many inmate-on-inmate assaults appear to have been preventable by jail staff.�


“Many of the incidents of inmate assaults at GCDC appear to occur because GCDC fails to classify appropriately its potential predatory and vulnerable inmates.�


“The provision for acute and chronic medical care at GCDC likewise appears to deviate from constitutional minimum standards.  Nor does GCDC offer any  psychiatric case whatsoever, even for those inmates classified as suicidal or who are suffering from mental illness..�


The report declares staffing and training of staff as inadequate.  The report strong criticized the improper medication of inmates.  The report says some inmates were given the wrong medication for their medical or psychiatric conditions, and some were given prescriptions without any medical evaluation of their condition.


The letter threatened the filing of a federal lawsuit against the jail if improvements recommended in the report were not instituted.


The justice department commented that the jail staff was cooperative in the investigation.

Rep. Ron Lewis does not file for reelection to U.S. House. Four others do file.

Tuesday, January 29th, 2008

Jan. 29th. 2008
U.S. Rep. Ron Lewis ended his re-election campaign on Tuesday in a surprise last-minute move. Lewis withdrew from the race only moments before the campaign filing deadline.  Lewis’s decision to retire has been followed by dozens of other Republican representatives and senators who express a lack of interest in their jobs since the Democrats took control of congress after the 2006 election, and in view of the polls which show the democrats may increase their majorities in both houses in Nov. of 2008.

The most widely known candidatej in the 2nd District race  is Democrat Dave Boswell.  The following candidates filed for the 2nd   Congressional District which will be vacated by Rep. Lewis.

Name                                                                District              District Type                       Party Affiliation
       David E. Boswell                                        2 nd                     Congressional District            Democrat
        Reid Haire                                                 2 nd                     Congressional District            Democrat
        Daniel London                                           2 nd                     Congressional District            Republican
        S. Brett Guthrie                                         2 nd                     Congressional District            Republican

Governor Beshear Reappoints Logsdon and Jennings as Citizen Members of the Judicial Conduct Commission

Tuesday, January 29th, 2008

Jan. 29th, 2008 

FRANKFORT, KY – Gov. Steve Beshear has appointed Diane Logsdon and Joyce King Jennings as members of the Judicial Retirement and Removal Commission. Both shall serve for terms expiring January 1, 2012.

Logsdon, 65, is a hospital administrator at Hardin Memorial Hospital in Elizabethtown. She received her bachelor’s degree from St. Joseph’s College and her master’s degree from the University of Louisville. She is a licensed Registered Nurse and is certified in physician practice management.

Jennings, 57, is a self-employed event planner with JKJ, Inc., in Louisville. She is also a licensed real estate agent with Ken Hinton Real Estate in Pewee Valley. She attended the University of Kentucky.

The Commission functions under rules established by the Supreme Court of Kentucky and has authority over judges, trial commissioners, domestic relations commissioners, master commissioners and attorneys who are candidates for judicial office.

It is composed of six voting members who serve four-year terms; one representative and one alternate from District Court, Circuit Court, the Kentucky Court of Appeals and the Kentucky Bar Association, and two citizen representatives appointed by the Governor who are neither judges nor attorneys.

The Commission is the only entity authorized under the Kentucky Constitution to take disciplinary action against a sitting Kentucky judge. The group investigates and reviews complaints against judges and, when warranted, conducts hearings regarding the alleged misconduct where evidence is presented.



Tuesday, January 29th, 2008

LawReader Senior Editor Stan Billingsley    Jan. 29, 2008

We have been receiving some inquiries about how divorce attorney fees are set.  These inquiries detail horror stories where the deep pocket spouse is getting nailed with six figure attorney fees from the opposing spouse’s attorney.

These stories often focus on itemized bills that claim the attorney spent hours reading depositions that they attended, and which could be read in minutes not hours.  We have heard of attorney charges of 1 billable hour for reading a 1 page letter. (???)

We are hearing of cases where an attorney is replaced mid-divorce and the new attorney is billing tens of thousands of dollars to get up to speed in the case by reading the pleadings and depositions.

One case we recall nailed the husband for an excess of $100,000 in attorney fees, but he had initially offered a 50-50 split down the middle, and the wife who got the large fee was his business book keeper and had all the financial records.  The wife ended up getting not much more than her attorney did, and with the attorney fee deducted she got far less than the initial offer. (This case was in Maryland.)

The only law on this that we are aware of, allows the trial judge to pretty much use his/her discretion in awarding attorney fees.

We are seeking from our users information on fee awards that seem to have been excessive. If you know of any ethics rulings, guidelines, protocols, or cases which provide guidance for the court in making a reasonable award of attorney fees, please forward them to LawReader.

We want to know what a reasonable attorney’s fee is in a divorce case.

Do attorneys have an ethical duty to not be a party to vengeful use of discovery to drive up the bill that the other spouse with the deep pocket will have to pay.

How pro active should the trial judge in Family Court be, in monitoring discovery and attorney fees?

Please e-mail your comments to:


Tuesday, January 29th, 2008

John David Dyche in his Courier-Journal column has called on Gov. Beshear to endorse several  Republican bills that have been introduced in this session of the General Assembly.  Of the bills discussed by Dyche, we find great merit.  While these bills were all introduced by Republicans, they are not partisan bills.  They appear to benefit the Public more than any Party.

 “Senate Bill 3, sponsored by Republican Senate President David Williams of Burkesville, would move the filing deadline to the last Tuesday in April, and the primary election to late August. It would also abolish the gubernatorial runoff primary that is triggered if no candidate gets more than 40 percent of the vote.“

LawReader comment:  The current practice of wasting time during the first two weeks of the legislature while all the members wait for the filing date to expire is a waste of taxpayer money.  Either put the filing date before the legislature begins, move the starting date of the legislature, or as SB 3 proposes, move the filing date to Aug.  This would have the benefit of reducing campaign costs for candidates.  The current Primary being in May and the General election in August, means that all candidates have to run two campaigns.  This bill would also repeal the Gubernatorial run-off election law.  SB 3 sounds like a good idea to us.

“Republican Sen. Damon Thayer’s SB 8 would improve campaign finance reporting. Endorsed by Republican Secretary of State Trey Grayson, the bill adds reports due 60 days before statewide primary elections and 60 days before general elections for all candidates. It also requires candidates raising over $25,000 in one election cycle to electronically file their reports with the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance. “

LawReader comment:   This open records type bill is a good idea.  There is no reason to hide the names of political contributors until after the election.   This Sun Shine law should be adopted.

HB105 - Taxpayer Transparency Act of 2008:   “One is Bowling Green Rep. Jim DeCesare’s Taxpayer Transparency Act of 2008. It would require the Finance and Administration Cabinet to create a searchable Web site of state treasury expenditures of $5,000 or more. Several other states are already doing this. Beshear says he will make state government more accountable. This act would make it easier for citizens, journalists and public officials to help him make it happen.â€?

LawReader comment:  HB105 This act would allow competing vendors see how much the state is paying for contracts and services.  This information should be public, and we see the potential for competitors to be motivated to lower their prices when bidding for state business.  If there is waste in state government, we can think of no stronger tool to discover such waste.  Allowing the public to closely inspect the actual expenditures of state government will quickly reveal “waste fraud and abuse� that everyone talks about,,,and then ignores. 

SB 7 Introduced by Senator David Williams would give bonding authority to new “public infrastructure authorities” for big public facility projects. 

LawReader comment:  This bill would allow alternatives for financing state projects such as the Louisville and Covington Ohio River Bridge projects. This bill would, “create a new section of KRS 175B to allow a public infrastructure authority the same ability as is granted the Department of Highways to enter into a partnership with a private entity to construct or operate a project under this chapter; create a new section of KRS 175B to allow an authority to place tolls on a project and set out procedures for collection and distribution of tolls.�  While tolls are not popular, and no one seems interested in raising the gas tax in state or federal governments, this may be the only alternative available to finance these billion dollar projects.  This bill will at least provide options for future consideration for the funding of these projects. 

Judicial candidate filings as of Jan. 28th. – Deadline Jan. 29th.

Monday, January 28th, 2008

 Ky. Supreme Court

James M. “Jim” Shake 4 th Supreme Court District Nonpartisan

Court of Appeals


  Denise G. Clayton 4 th Appellate District 2nd Nonpartisan

Circuit Court filings as of Jan. 28th.   Deadline Jan. 29th. at 4 P.M.

  Olu A. Stevens 30 th Judicial Circuit 4th Nonpartisan
  Robert “Bob” Silverthorn 30 th Judicial Circuit 4th Nonpartisan

District Court filings as of Jan. 28th.   Deadline Jan. 29th. at 4 P.M>

  Kathleen Lape 16 th Judicial District 4th Nonpartisan
  Keith Johnson 16 th Judicial District 4th Nonpartisan
  Ken Easterling 16 th Judicial District 4th Nonpartisan
  Mary Fortner Rafizadeh 16 th Judicial District 4th Nonpartisan
  Patrick Monohan 16 th Judicial District 4th Nonpartisan
  Gilbert E. Holland 27 th Judicial District 2nd Nonpartisan
  Harold Fish Dyche II. 27 th Judicial District 2nd Nonpartisan
  John Chappell 27 th Judicial District 2nd Nonpartisan
  Randy Azbill 27 th Judicial District 2nd Nonpartisan
  Vanessa L. Sears 27 th Judicial District 2nd Nonpartisan
  Allyson Cox 30 th Judicial District 16th Nonpartisan
  Ann Bailey Smith 30 th Judicial District 16th Nonpartisan
  Anne Dedman Watkins 30 th Judicial District 16th Nonpartisan
  Benjamin Francis Wyman 30 th Judicial District 16th Nonpartisan
  David P. Bowles 30 th Judicial District 16th Nonpartisan
  Jan Firkins Brightwell 30 th Judicial District 16th Nonpartisan
  Katie King 30 th Judicial District 16th Nonpartisan
  Matthew H. Welch 30 th Judicial District 16th Nonpartisan
  Sheila Berman 30 th Judicial District 16th Nonpartisan
  Shelley Santry 30 th Judicial District 16th Nonpartisan
  Stephanie Pearce Burke 30 th Judicial District 16th Nonpartisan
  Aaron J. Silletto 30 th Judicial District 16th Nonpartisan
  Fred F. White 34 th Judicial District 2nd Nonpartisan
  Jane R. Butcher 34 th Judicial District 2nd Nonpartisan
  Jason P. Price 34 th Judicial District 2nd Nonpartisan
  Leroy A. Gilbert Jr. 34 th Judicial District 2nd Nonpartisan
  Henria Bailey-Lewis 41 st Judicial District 2nd Nonpartisan
  John T. Aubrey 41 st Judicial District 2nd Nonpartisan

Candidate filings for Ky. Legislature as of Jan. 28th.

Monday, January 28th, 2008

With one day to go the  following candidates for Ky. State Senate have filed their candidacy papers.  The deadline is 4 P.M. Tuesday Jan. 29th.

  Carroll Hubbard 1 st Senatorial District Democrat
  Rick Johnson 1 st Senatorial District Democrat
  Kenneth W. Winters 1 st Senatorial District Republican
  Joey Pendleton 3 rd Senatorial District Democrat
  Tom Jones 3 rd Senatorial District Republican
  Carroll Gibson 5 th Senatorial District Republican
  Julian M. Carroll 7 th Senatorial District Democrat
  Horace F. Johnson 9 th Senatorial District Democrat
  John Rogers 9 th Senatorial District Democrat
  Steve Newberry 9 th Senatorial District Democrat
  Bob Bryant 9 th Senatorial District Republican
  David P. Givens 9 th Senatorial District Republican
  Jeffrey S.”Jeff” Jobe 9 th Senatorial District Republican
  Charlie Walton 11 th Senatorial District Republican
  John Schickel 11 th Senatorial District Republican
  Ernesto Scorsone 13 th Senatorial District Democrat
  Vernie McGaha 15 th Senatorial District Republican
  Robert Powell 17 th Senatorial District Democrat
  Damon Thayer 17 th Senatorial District Republican
  Tim Shaughnessy 19 th Senatorial District Democrat
  Bob Heleringer 19 th Senatorial District Republican
  Tom Jensen 21 st Senatorial District Republican
  Kathy Groob 23 rd Senatorial District Democrat
  Jack Westwood 23 rd Senatorial District Republican
  Michael “Whitey” Adkins 25 th Senatorial District Democrat
  Pete M. Frye 25 th Senatorial District Democrat
  Robert Stivers 25 th Senatorial District Republican
  Walter “Doc” Blevins 27 th Senatorial District Democrat
  Eric Shane Hamilton 29 th Senatorial District Democrat
  Johnny Ray Turner 29 th Senatorial District Democrat
  Ray Jones 31 st Senatorial District Democrat
  Gerald A. Neal 33 rd Senatorial District Democrat
  Marshall “Marty” Gazaway 33 rd Senatorial District Democrat
  Denise Harper Angel 35 th Senatorial District Democrat
  Perry B. Clark 37 th Senatorial District Democrat
  Doug Hawkins 37 th Senatorial District Republican

State House of Representative Candidates as of Jan. 28th.   – Deadline Jan. 29th.