DETERS FILES REPLY BRIEF ON 6th. CIRCUIT APPEAL FOR ATTORNEY MEREDITH LAWRENCE

Case No. 12-6450
__________________________________________________________________
IN THE
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee.
v.
MEREDITH LAWRENCE,
Defendant-Appellant
_______________________________________________________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY (REEVES, D.)
__________________________________________________________________
APPELLANT MEREDITH LAWRENCE’S REPLY BRIEF
__________________________________________________________________
Eric C. Deters
Eric C. Deters & Partners, P.S.C.
5247 Madison Pike
Independence, KY 41501
Phone: (859) 363-1900
Fax: (859) 363-1444
eric@ericdeters.com
Counsel for Appellant Meredith
Lawrence

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ……………………………………………………………………………… ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ………………………………………………………………………… ii
ARGUMENT ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 1
A. The Failure of the Indictment to Descend to Particulars Prejudiced Mr.
Lawrence’s Trial when it Allowed Mr. Lawrence to be Tried on Multiple False
Statements without Unanimity and Allowed the Government to Introduce
Evidence of Other False Documents not Included in the Indictment ……………….. 1
B. Mr. Lawrence was Subjected to Prejudice by the Indictment ………………….. 9
C. There is No Evidence of a Signature on the 2005 and 2006 Tax Returns for
which Mr. Lawrence was Indicted ……………………………………………………………..13
D. Counsel for the Defendant was Ineffective and the Trial Court has
Adequately Developed the Record ……………………………………………………………..15
CONCLUSION …………………………………………………………………………………………..16
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ……………………………………………………………..17
ADDENDUM – DESIGNATION OF APPENDIX CONTENTS ……………………..18
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ……………………………………………………………………..18
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974)……………………………..16
Russell v United States., 369 U.S. 749, 770 (1962) …………………………………………… 3
See United States v. Larson, 612 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979) ………………………………. 6
U.S. v. Mohney, 949 F.2d 1397, 1407 (6th Cir. 1991) ……………………………………….. 1
United States v. Adams, 314 F App’x 633 (5th Cir. 2009) …………………………………. 8
United States v. Beeler, 587 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1979) ……………………………………….. 7
United States v. Cashio, 420 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1990) …………………………………….. 8
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, (1875) …………………………………………….. 3
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United States v. Cseplo, 42 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 1994) ………………………………………… 6
United States v. Currier, 166 F.2d 346 (1st Cir. 1948) ……………………………………… 6
United States v. Davis, 226 F.2d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 1955) ………………………………..10
United States v. Duncan, 850 F.2d 1104 (6th Cir. 1988) ………………………………..3, 4
United States v. Fawaz, 881 F.2d 259, 265 (6th Cir. 1989) ………………………………13
United States v. Fraduy, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) …………………………………………………16
United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483 (1888) ……………………………………………………… 3
United States v. Kramer, 955 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1990) ……………………………………… 8
United States v. Kruse, 2009 WL 1514408 at *2 (E.D. Wis. May 30, 2009) ………14
United States v. Lodwick, 410 F.2d 1202, 1205-06 (8th Cir. 1969) …………………….. 6
United States v. Massaro, 538 U.S. 500, 508 (2003) ……………………………………….15
United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 140(1985) …………………………………………….. 5
United States v. Miller, 545 F.2d 1204 (9th Cir. 1976) ……………………………………… 8
United States v. Superior Growers Supply, 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir. 1993) …….. 2
United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 44 (2nd Cir. 1999) …………………………………… 3
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ARGUMENT

A. The Failure of the Indictment to Descend to Particulars Prejudiced Mr.
Lawrence’s Trial when it Allowed Mr. Lawrence to be Tried on
Multiple False Statements without Unanimity and Allowed the
Government to Introduce Evidence of Other False Documents not
Included in the Indictment

The indictment, under which Mr. Lawrence was charged, failed to descend
to particulars and denied Mr. Lawrence from having access to Constitutional
protections. The government contends that the indictment was sufficient and that
the five separate categories of income introduced by the government do not
constitute a variation or amendment of the indictment because of the generalized
terms used in the indictment. The government also indicates that included in the
evidence at trial are six other tax forms signed by Mr. Lawrence under penalties of
perjury, but not the subject of the indictment.

In an attempt to bolster its position, the government claims that the only
thing that an indictment for a 7206(1) violation must include are all of the elements
of the crime. (Government’s Brief, p. 22). However, Mohney, the case cited by the
government, dealt with sufficiency of the evidence, not the sufficiency of the
indictment. See U.S. v. Mohney, 949 F.2d 1397, 1407 (6th Cir. 1991). What is
obvious is that an indictment alleging that a defendant prepared a false tax return,
without more factual information, is not sufficient. See United States v. Cochrane,
985 F.2d 1027, 1031 (9th Cir.1993).
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Further, this Court has cautioned that while the “language of the statute may
be used in the general description of the offense,” it nonetheless “must be
accompanied with such a statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform
the accused of the specific offense … with which he is charged.” United States v.
Superior Growers Supply, 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir. 1993). The allegation that
Mr. Lawrence misstated his Adjusted Gross Income or Taxable Income does no
better job to apprise Mr. Lawrence of the claims brought against him than if the
indictment solely alleged that Mr. Lawrence filed a false form 1040.
Due to the general nature of the allegations that Mr. Lawrence understated
his AGI, the government was permitted to present any and all proof of any of the
combination of thirty different false statements, and the fact that the government
rested on five separate sources of income does not lead to an amended or
duplicitous indictment. The government states as much in its response brief.
(Government’s Brief, p. 29). This is not merely the use of multiple corroborative
methods of proof, this was evidence of five separate types of income, each of
which had its own place on Mr. Lawrence’s tax return. This lack of specificity in
the indictment ultimately led to a variance or constructive amendment of the
indictment.
The Indictment Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that an indictment
contain some amount of factual particularity to ensure that the prosecution will not
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fill in elements of its case with facts other than those considered by the grand
jury.” United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 44 (2nd Cir. 1999).
To allow the prosecutor, or the court, to make a subsequent guess as
to what was in the minds of the grand jury at the time they returned
the indictment would deprive the defendant of a basic protection
which the guaranty of the intervention of a grand jury was designed to
secure. For a defendant could then be convicted on the basis of facts
not found by, and perhaps not even presented to, the grand jury which
indicted him.

Russell v United States., 369 U.S. 749, 770 (1962). “[W]here the definition of an
offence, whether it be at common law or by statute, includes generic terms, it is not
sufficient that the indictment shall charge the offence in the same generic terms as
in the definition; but it must state the species,-it must descend to particulars.”
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, (1875). “Undoubtedly, the language of
the statute may be used in the general description of an offense, but it must be
accompanied with such a statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform
the accused of the specific offense, coming under the general description, with
which he is charged.” United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483 (1888).
The government, in essence, argues that the gravamen of the crime is the
filing of a false document, but this Court in Duncan has held that the essence of the
statute lies in the willful falsity of the statement. United States v. Duncan, 850 F.2d
1104 (6th Cir. 1988) (Abrogated on other grounds). In making this determination,
the Court noted that the theory of the government’s case in Duncan, and which
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mirrors the theory of the government’s case here, is consistent with a tax evasion
charge rather than a 7206(1) charge.

If this were a prosecution for tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. § 7201, the
reasoning would be different. The gist of a tax evasion charge is
willful evasion of tax by filing a return that may involve multiple
complex understatements or omissions made in a course of continuing
conduct. Cf. United States v. Lennon, 246 F.2d 24, 27 (2d Cir.1957)
(separate acts of understatement of income and fraudulent exemptions
named in single count were “different methods by which a single
offense may have been effectuated”).

Id. In contrast, Duncan holds that each separate false statement on an applicable
form requires unanimity. Id.

Mr. Lawrence had trouble gaining access to and understanding exactly what
false statements that he made. In December 2011, Mr. Lawrence requested
discovery of every document upon which the government rested its case and from
which it would present proof. The government responded that there are no specific
forms, filings, or other documents for which Mr. Lawrence was charged and the
government would not provide other specifics or particulars other than that stated
in the indictment. (Exhibit 1, Letter from December 2011). The government never
mentioned any income from corporate or partnership income, or any other forms or
items that “flowed through” to Mr. Lawrence’s personal 1040’s.

Mr. Lawrence rested a portion of his defense in combating the allegations of
a falsely reported deduction for the gift of real estate which Mr. Lawrence had
utilized to reduce his tax liability in 2004, by roughly $750,000. Such a deduction
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would have the effect of making Mr. Lawrence’s adjusted gross income higher
than what he had reported in the 2004 tax year. Yet no evidence was offered during
trial to the effect of this evidence. A conviction that rests, no matter how
comfortably, on proof of another offense cannot stand. United States v. Miller, 471
U.S. 130, 140(1985).

During the Government’s opening statement, the prosecutor almost
immediately indicated the importance of those additional tax returns and the five
sources of income that would be central to the government’s case. (RE 97, p. 1205)
You’re going to hear and see — you’re going to hear evidence
and see other forms that are associated with this 1040, other IRS
forms like Form 1065 and an 1120-S. What’s important for you all to
know is that all of those supporting forms, all of the information on
those forms, all of the income, flowed through to the 1040, which is
where all of Mr. Lawrence’s income should have been reported.
Ladies and gentlemen, these returns that Mr. Lawrence filed
were false, because he collected income generally in the form of cash
from his various businesses that was never reflected in the
QuickBooks accounts, was never provided by Mr. Lawrence to his
CPA and, as a result, never ended up on his tax returns.
Ladies and gentlemen, you’re going hear about five different
sources of income that Mr. Lawrence failed to report.

(RE 97, p. 1205). The six business returns were identified further by detailing the
business entities. All six business returns were not the subject of any Grand Jury
indictment or any alleged ‘perjury’ by the Grand Jury. But the government
continued to place before the jury these unindicted returns, every day of the trial
with testimony and identification and marking them as exhibits.
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False reporting on each of these documents would be a separate crime, as the
forms contain the jurat and could have been indicted separately. The government
hinged its prosecution of Mr. Lawrence on a strategy of diversion, to indict Mr.
Lawrence on his personal tax returns and enter into evidence false statements
contained on other forms for which Mr. Lawrence was not indicted. See United
States v. Larson, 612 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Lodwick, 410
F.2d 1202, 1205-06 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Currier, 166 F.2d 346 (1st
Cir. 1948); United States v. Cseplo, 42 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 1994).

The “United States Department of Justice Tax Division Criminal Tax
Manual” was updated in 2008 prior to the indictment in this case. Specifically the
manual provides the federal prosecutor with a wide array of various indictment
forms and templates approved and recommended by the DOJ Tax Division.
Chapter twelve of the manual is dedicated to the indictments for False Statements
including 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). The manual requires that an indictment is to spell
out the ‘specifics’ and the ‘particulars’ of items of income and deductions that are
essential. The government failed to rely on the resources in its control to prosecute
this case. (Exhibit 2, Manual Excerpt).

Further, based on the government’s actions during trial, it would be
impossible for Mr. Lawrence to plead judgment of conviction or acquittal if the
government was to re-try him for statements made on the corporation or business
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returns. The government offered this evidence at trial and still contends that these
documents funneled into Mr. Lawrence’s personal 1040’s. In all likelihood, Mr.
Lawrence was convicted for his signatures affixed to these other returns, especially
considering that no signatures were presented for two of the three years for which
he was indicted.

Mr. Lawrence could also face another trial based on the individual
statements, rather than the AGI. The false statement is the basis of the charge, and
Mr. Lawrence has yet to be indicted for misstating his income from Racers, or
tenant rent, or IOLTA holdings, or PSC income. While he has been effectively
convicted for all of these items, the statement, under the government’s theory, for
which he has been convicted, is a separate statement from the other’s introduced at
trial.

The lack of particularity in the factual assertions in the indictment led to Mr.
Lawrence to being prosecuted for five separate false statements and likely for the
forms, which had separate jurats and signatures, which flowed into his personal
1040’s. An Amendment to an Indictment occurs when there is an alteration, literal
or in effect, in its terms. United States v. Beeler, 587 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1979).
“Such amendments are prejudicial per-se and an amended indictment conviction
must be reversed.” Id.
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During the hearing to finalize the jury instruction the government noted that,
“there appears to be a discrepancy in the way the elements of the offense are
broken out.” (RE 105, p. 2733). Mr. Lawrence merely indicated that he preferred
that the instructions track the language of the indictment. (RE 105, p. 2735). At
this point Mr. Lawrence noted the issues in the way the indictment reads as
compared to the evidence produced at trial. (RE 105, p. 2743). It was at this point
that the instruction for count three was changed from taxable income to AGI. A
judicial amendment of the indictment, whether implicit or explicit, is per se
reversible. United States v. Kramer, 955 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1990).
The jury instructions also broadened the time element of the offense
charged, removing the time at which Mr. Lawrence was to have known about the
false statement. The date in a 7206(1) case is a critical element of the charge as the
crime is committed when the false statement is made/filed/subscribed to. The false
statement must be known at “the time of signing” the return. See United States v.
Adams, 314 F App’x 633 (5th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Miller, 545 F.2d
1204 (9th Cir. 1976); and United States v. Cashio, 420 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1990).
The government cites to Hart to rectify the duplicitous amendment to the
indictment by showing that “corroborative methods of proof” are permitted to
prove a tax case. This is misleading, in that Mr. Lawrence in no way is attacking
the method of proof used by the government. Hart addresses corroborative
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methods of proof for a case that an expert would use to show that income was
different than is claimed by a defendant. Importantly, the method of proof chosen
is chosen by the agent, not the prosecutor who decides what information to present.
Here Agent Moening used this method to try to demonstrate that Mr. Lawrence
made false statements about each item of income.

If the government had chosen to introduce evidence about 30 separate items
for each of the 6 unindicted income tax returns, a method of proof would have still
been required to demonstrate that the amounts claimed by any defendant were
false. There is no method of proof issue, the issue is whether the number of
statements used was misleading due to the lack of particularity in the indictment
and the subsequent addition separate false statements. ‘Corroborative Methods’ of
proof employed by case agent Moening has nothing to do with the Adjusted Gross
Income pled as the perjured False Statement on the 1040.

B. Mr. Lawrence was Subjected to Prejudice by the Indictment
As further evidence of prejudice, Mr. Lawrence, during trial, stated that he
was holding all the ‘house fees’ pursuant to the “Safekeeping Ethical Rules” of the
Kentucky Bar Association. If the defendant would have acted otherwise and placed
the funds into his personal possession or placed them into the company PSC
QuickBooks from which they came, he would be subject to professional discipline,
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including potential disbarment, as well as probably guilty of conversion. (RE 101,
p. 2166 – 2168, 2148, 2213, 2214, 2229 & 2226).

The senior partner had requested that Mr. Lawrence hold onto the house fees
as security for the loans that were to be repaid to the lawyer was because this Mr.
Lawrence was trustworthy. Through the years there had been ‘leakage’ or theft of
the house fees when they were held in the company safe on premise at the
partnership. (RE 103, p. 2345). The house fees in this case were not income to
the defendant in any of the indicted years, and had already had taxes paid on them
at the PSC level before being loaned to the Partnership.

Where a taxpayer shows credible defense and proof of relevant issue – i e the
dollars alleged to be income but were in fact paid to him are not taxable, the
burden shifts to the government to overcome the defense. 26 USC § 6221.Money
“becomes income when recipient has such control over it that as a practical matter,
he derives readily recognizable economic value from it.” United States v. Davis,
226 F.2d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 1955). “That occurs when cash is delivered by its
owner to the taxpayer in a manner which allows the recipient freedom to dispose of
it at will.” Id.

Mr. Lawrence had an ethical duty to maintain certain income pursuant to the
‘Safekeeping Rules’ and Fiduciary responsibilities of a lawyer. It is required of a
lawyer in Kentucky to ‘not claim or use’ disputed funds until the litigation is
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finished or the dispute is resolved. Here Mr. Lawrence was involved in a dispute
with a business partner and as such was holding the fees while awaiting the dispute
to resolve. A portion of the government’s evidence that the money was income was
based on a letter that was written in December 2007, about half a year after Mr.
Lawrence filed his 2006 income tax return. Mr. Lawrence’s counsel failed to
object to the introduction of the letter and even further, the government presented
no rebuttal evidence.

Further, Mr. Lawrence gave testimony that the Racer’s house fees were set
aside as security for the loans made to the business and never surpassed the ‘basis’
he had in the partnership, of over $700,000. Any income that Mr. Lawrence
received in the form of Racer’s fees never surpassed the loan basis that he had in
the company. Mr. Lawrence’s expert was not allowed to testify based upon the
untimely disclosure of the testimony, due in large part to the confusion caused by
the indictment. Mr. Lawrence could not decipher what actions he was being
charged with. There was no notice in the indictment and no specifics or particulars
to assist in preparing Mr. Lawrence’s defense.

There was no evidence presented to the jury, other than the CPA who
testified there was no income to Mr. Lawrence from the Racer’s house fees. (RE
105& 103, p. 2669, 2682, 2669, 2630, 2666, 2477, 2481). “An individual has
received income when he gains complete dominion and control over money or
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other property, thereby realizing economic benefit. It does not matter what the
money represents from the standpoint of the company.

Further Mr. Lawrence proscribed from engaging in preparation of tax
documents during the relevant years. As a member of the Kentucky Judiciary
Lawrence was a duly sworn member of the Kentucky Judiciary, a Trial
Commissioner.(RE 101, p. 2212). As such, he was instructed by the Administrative
Office of the Courts that he needed to obtain the services of a tax return preparer
and avoid becoming involved in engaging in preparation of tax returns. This
prohibition on this individual taxpayer is codified/written in the Judicial Ethics
Opinions (JE-5) for the State of Kentucky (RE 101, p. 2085 – 2086). Fulfilling that
duty and his obligation to file federal tax returns Mr. Lawrence retained and hired a
Certified Public Accountant professional to examine, (RE 100, p.1997), correct
(RE 101, p. 2029 – 2033) and oversee the computerized accounting (RE 100, p.
1963) and all tax return, preparation, and filing. (RE 100, p. 1961). Unknown to
Mr. Lawrence, the CPA did not reconcile the various accounts. There was never
any notice of tax due, tax bill, or audit (not even a phone call or letter) about any
inconsistency in any return from any government agency or from anyone else. The
amounts in issue, missed or mistakenly not counted by the CPA equals less than
.005 of 1% of the Gross Revenues for the years at issue. Even with little or no
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rebuttal evidence, Mr. Lawrence was convicted and likely due to the confusion
caused by indictments as presented.

C. There is No Evidence of a Signature on the 2005 and 2006 Tax Returns
for which Mr. Lawrence was Indicted

Contrary to the government’s assertion, it did not provide all supporting
forms signed by Mr. Lawrence during the 2005 and 2006 tax years. Specifically
missing from this list are the form 8879’s for those years. What exhibits 1-15 does
include are forms not subject to the indictment, including for tax year 2003, and
tax forms signed by Mr. Lawrence for his business accounts. This fact only serves
to highlight the fact that there is no evidence that Mr. Lawrence signed forms 8879
for tax years 2005 and 2006. His signature is present for his other returns but is
missing on the forms for which he was indicted.
The government relies on Fawaz, for proposition that 7206(1) does not
require the defendant’s signature to sustain a conviction. (Government Brief, p.
31). Fawaz is an interpretation of Ponder and deals specifically with the signature
as evidence of willfulness or knowledge of falsity. See United States v. Fawaz, 881
F.2d 259, 265 (6th Cir. 1989). What the government tries to hide is the fact that a
signature is still required for 7206(1) to be invoked in the first place. It is Mr.
Lawrence’s position, based on the interpretation of 26 U.S.C. § 6061, that in order
for an electronically signed return to be valid, a taxpayer must conform to the rules
put in place by the IRS for the filing of those forms. The government has failed to
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demonstrate that anyone signed the 2005 and 2006 1040’s because there is no
evidence of compliance with the IRS procedures for filing the returns
electronically. Specifically, the IRS requires that a form 8879 be signed by a
taxpayer, and no 8879’s were introduced into evidence for 2005 and 2006.
Further, the government’s contention that a tax payer’s PIN number serves
as a signature is misplaced, as is the government’s reliance on Kruse. In Kruse, the
defendant did not challenge the use of the PIN, so it was not subject to scrutiny by
the court, and the government placed into evidence forms 8879 for each relevant
year. See United States v. Kruse, 2009 WL 1514408 at *2 (E.D. Wis. May 30,
2009). Kruse only works to strengthen Mr. Lawrence’s position, as the forms 8879
were not entered into evidence for tax years 2005 and 2006. It should be noted that
the government had been investigating Mr. Lawrence since 2007 and was not
indicted until four years later, in 2011, yet still failed to bring these documents for
consideration by the jury.

Further, as indicated in Mr. Lawrence’s principal brief, Mr. Ryan was not
aware that all returns were authorized by Mr. Lawrence’s signature prior to the
filing of the returns. Finally, any assertion that may have been made regarding the
signature of Mr. Lawrence’s 2004 tax return not being valid was simply a
typographical error on part of Mr. Lawrence. The government entered a form 8879
for the tax year 2004 and have satisfied the requirement showing that Mr.
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Lawrence signed this tax form for purposes of 26 U.S.C. § 6061. However the
same cannot be said for tax years 2005 and 2006.
The Court further amended the indictment, when it added the electronic
filing language into the jury instructions for each count. “An authorized Electronic
filing is sufficient to satisfy the 1st element of the crimes(s) charged even if the
income tax return does not contain the defendants actual written signature.” Further
the government claimed that there was a form 8879 for each count, in direct
contradiction to the fact that the government only brought one form 8879 for the
2004 tax year. Additionally this added element uses plural (crimes) which
further bolsters the ‘constructive amendments” of the Business Tax Returns also
being included in each count.

D. Counsel for the Defendant was Ineffective and the Trial Court has
Adequately Developed the Record
It is to the discretion of the Court of Appeals as to whether it will consider
Mr. Lawrence’s claims that his trial counsel was ineffective when the record is
apparent. “Direct review is appropriate where trial counsel is so ineffective and
apparent from the record that appellate counsel may consider it advisable to raise
the issue on direct appeal. United States v. Massaro, 538 U.S. 500, 508 (2003);
United States v. Valdez, 362 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 2004). It has been held: “When a
2255 petitioner fails to object to alleged errors in his direct criminal appeal he must
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show cause excusing this procedural default and actual prejudice resulting from
alleged errors. United States v. Fraduy, 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
Defense counsel must conscientiously protect his client’s interests by
asserting all apparently substantial defenses available to the defendant in a proper
and timely manner. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974).
Defense counsel’s performance was so limited that it failed to subject the
prosecutor’s case to meaningful adversarial testing. Id.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Lawrence was subjected to what was likely a purposefully obscure
indictment designed to confound his presentation of a meaningful defense. It is
more than a stretch to indict a person for an act which includes thousands of
combinations of false statements and claim that the defendant was sufficiently
apprised of the conduct he had to defend. Mr. Lawrence was denied the
opportunity to defend against the charges due to the insufficient indictment.

Further, the use of a PIN only serves as a signature when the taxpayer follows all
prescribed regulations set by the IRS. Finally, trial counsel for the Defendant were
clearly ineffective and the Court has sufficient facts to make a determination.

Therefore Mr. Lawrence requests that the Court reverse his conviction.
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 32(a)(7)(c) and Sixth Circuit Rule 32(a), the
undersigned certifies that this brief complies with the type-volume limitations of
Sixth Circuit Rule 32(a)(7)(b). The brief has been prepared in proportional
typeface using Times New Roman 14 point.

Exclusive of the portions of the brief exempted by Sixth Circuit Rule
32(a)(7)(B)(iii), the brief contains 3,940 words. If the Court so requests, the
undersigned will provide an electronic version of the brief and/or a copy of the
word or line printout.

The undersigned understands a material misrepresentation in completing this
certificate or circumvention of the type volume limits in Sixth Circuit Rule
32(a)(7), may result in the Court’s striking the brief and imposing sanctions against
the person signing the brief.

/s/ Eric C. Deters___________
Eric C. Deters
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ADDENDUM – DESIGNATION OF APPENDIX CONTENTS
Defendant-Appellant, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 28(d)
and 30(b), hereby designate the following portions of the record below for
inclusion in the Joint Appendix:
Description of Entry Date Docket #
Transcript of Trial Proceedings- Volume II 03/04/2013 97
Transcript of Trial Proceedings- Volume VI 03/08/2013 101
Transcript of Trial Proceedings- Volume VII 03/08/2013 103
Transcript of Trial Proceedings- Volume VIII 03/08/2013 105

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on June 10, 2013, a true copy of the foregoing corrected
appellate brief has been sent via the Court’s CM/ECF system which will serve all
counsel of record:
/s/ Eric C. Deters___________
Eric C. Deters

Attorney for Defendant
Meredith L. Lawrence
Eric C. Deters & Partners, P.S.C.
5247 Madison Pike
Independence, Kentucky 41051
Tel.: (859) 363-1900
Fax: (859) 363-1444
Email: eric@ericdeters.com

Case: 12-6450 Document: 006111718430 Filed: 06/11/2013 Page: 21 (21 of 30)
Case: 12-6450 Document: 006111718431 Filed: 06/11/2013 Page: 1 (22 of 30)
Case: 12-6450 Document

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